Sunday, January 8, 2012

BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO: Divorcing Your Tax Jurisdiction Can Trigger Painful "Alimony" Taxes

By Joseph B. Darby III and Murat Usta
People fall in love, and so do tax jurisdictions. People tend to fall in love with each other. Tax jurisdictions tend to fall in love with their tax revenues.
People, as well as tax jurisdictions, can also have a falling out. When the break up involves people, it is not only hard to do, but often very expensive. The break-up process is called "divorce" and its most costly consequence is called "alimony." In the cynical words of one divorce attorney, "Marriage is grand, but divorce is about 500 grand."
In the case of a corporate taxpayer and its tax jurisdiction, breaking up is sometimes even harder to do than it is for people. It can also be astonishingly expensive. The break-up process is called "exiting" the tax jurisdiction or "inverting" the corporate taxpayer, and its most painful consequence is the assessment of special "exit taxes." There are a wide variety of taxes that can be triggered by the departure of a corporation from its historic jurisdiction (including the transfer by a corporation of valuable assets from the jurisdiction while the corporation remains technically in place). For purposes of this article, this panoply of exit or transfer taxes are referred to (somewhat sardonically) as "alimony taxes."
In this post-modern world, divorce rates have soared and so have the types of corporate transfers that trigger alimony taxes. Breaking up may be hard to do, but it is also an inceasingly common experience. In this context, at least for the corporate taxpayer, a cautionary tale can be drawn from the world of people once in love: Sometimes it pays not to get married in the first place.
The purpose of this article is to examine how various businesses can take practical steps to address corporate alimony taxes, focusing on the United States. We will first review the most important alimony taxes imposed by the U.S., then offer some basic thoughts and strategies on how to anticipate and plan for an early, or at least a less expensive, exit. After all, few wealthy individuals these days enter into marriage without at least considering a prenuptial agreement. Any corporation with a valuable or promising business model—especially if it is based on intangible property or intellectual property—should at the very least do some "pre-nuptial" tax planning before entering into (and consummating) a domestic relationship with a specific tax jurisdiction.
The Scoop on Alimony Taxes
Jurisdictions compete to attract both new and existing businesses, a phenomenon called "charter competition."1 In a world of national tax systems that have significant disparities in tax rates,2 businesses naturally want to exploit such differences by locating and conducting business activities, when feasible, in the jurisdiction that imposes the lowest tax cost.
Not every business decision, of course, is driven solely by taxes. Multinational corporations may decide to move their manufacturing and labor-related activities to countries where the labor costs are low, while keeping their R&D in countries with highly skilled personnel. These business objectives may very well result in a migration of jobs and capital to other countries with lower tax rates and/or favorable tax incentives. Inevitably, countries (like the U.S.) experiencing an outflow of business operations tend to feel like they are being deprived of their "rightful" revenue base and respond by enacting "exit tax" laws, anti-inversion laws, or other types of alimony taxes. The most prominent U.S. alimony taxes will be discussed in a moment, but first we will address the tax phenomenon of the "accidental marriage."
Oops! The Accidental Marriage
A popular and often hysterically funny plot in Hollywood movies involves the "accidental marriage," where a male movie character goes to Las Vegas, drinks to excess, and wakes up the next day with no memory of the previous evening, but wearing a wedding ring identical to that of the female stranger in bed next to him. Oops! Don’t you hate when that happens?
Needless to say, no well-managed company should ever end up "accidentally married" to the wrong tax jurisdiction. However, plenty of companies choose to invest and develop valuable property, particularly intellectual property, in the jurisdiction where it is most convenient to produce it, not necessarily the jurisdiction where they want the property to be located and taxed once the creation process is completed. In some respects, choosing a jurisdiction solely because it is a convenient place to create the intellectual property is somewhat "accidental," but to be frank is probably located somewhere between "inattentive" and "knuckleheaded" and, when the company is later socked with exorbitant and unnecessary tax bills, may verge on "inexcusable."
The simple solution is to do what everyone should do before a marriage, which is to make a clear-eyed and sober evaluation of the consequences before entering into the arrangement. In the world of marriage, this is called a pre-nuptial agreement. In the world of corporations, it is called effective tax planning.
Alimony Taxes in the United States
There are a variety of ways to get out of a house, out of a marriage, or out of a tax jurisdiction. In the case of a house, you can walk out the front door, walk out the back door, or climb out the window. Similarly, a corporation seeking to leave a tax jurisdiction has a variety of choices as to its method of egress. However, the Internal Revenue Code offers an impressive array of mechanisms designed to block—or at least tax—most of the common exit strategies.
The "Hotel California" Approach to Taxation—Welcome to Section 7874
The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a number of prominent "inversion transactions," where U.S. corporations decided to "invert" their structure and become subsidiaries of foreign holding corporations to achieve a lower global effective tax rate.3 In response to this perceived trend, Congress enacted Section 78744 under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, to stop or at least inhibit inversion transactions.
Section 7874 is an anti-inversion5 statute that is intended to apply to an expatriated U.S. entity that meets the definition of a "surrogate foreign corporation" (or person related to such entity). A surrogate foreign corporation is a foreign corporation that satisfies the following three requirements:6
1. the foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the properties held directly or indirectly by a domestic corporation (or that constitute the trade or business of a domestic partnership) (Acquisition Test);
2. after the acquisition, at least 60 percent of the stock (by vote or value) of the foreign corporation is held by the former shareholders of the domestic corporation or partners in the partnership by reason of holding interest in the domestic corporation or partnership (Ownership Test); and
3. the expanded affiliated group (EAG) (determined by using the greater-than-50-percent common ownership test under Section 1504(a) for the acquiring foreign-incorporated entity or any affiliated company7) does not have substantial business activities in the foreign country where it is incorporated compared to the total worldwide business activities of the EAG (Substantial Business Activities Test).
Under the Ownership Test, Section 7874 applies a two-tier approach: (1) an 80 percent inversion (pure inversion), where the original shareholders of the U.S. corporation continue to own 80 percent or more of the "new" foreign corporation; and (2) a 60 percent inversion (limited inversion), where there is 60 percent or more, but less than 80 percent, continuity of the original shareholders. Under an 80 percent inversion, Section 7874 treats the foreign parent as a domestic corporation subject to full U.S. taxation.8 Under the 60 percent inversion, the foreign corporation is respected as a foreign taxpayer, but any "inversion gain" recognized by the expatriating corporation over the next 10 years is fully taxable by the U.S.9
"Inversion gain" includes not only the income or gain recognized by reason of the transfer of stock or other properties to a related person during the applicable 10-year period, but also includes any income triggered by the acquisition, such as income received or accrued by reason of a license as part of the acquisition, or a license to a foreign related person.10 Also, inversion gain cannot be reduced or offset by existing NOLs or foreign tax credits of the inverting U.S. corporate group.11 This determination and reporting of the "inversion gain" for 10 years following the expatriation event obviously creates considerable compliance burdens.
In short, the U.S. government has created an anti-inversion system that is significantly more onerous than a traditional "exit tax," which at least has the virtue that it is paid only once while exiting the jurisdiction. Instead Section 7874 mandates substantial trailing or on-going payment obligations.
Section 7874 Limitation
Section 7874 does not apply in situations where the former U.S.-parent group historically had business activities in the foreign country of the new parent corporation. Determining whether an EAG has substantial business activities in the acquiring corporation’s home country requires a facts-and-circumstances determination.12 The 2006 temporary regulations provide a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered for this purpose.13 These regulations also (briefly) included an alternative substantial business activities safe harbor test.14 Under this 2006 safe-harbor test, the EAG would be considered to have substantial business activities in the foreign acquiring corporation’s country of incorporation if the EAG:
1. has at least 10 percent of its employees (by headcount and compensation) based in the foreign country;
2. has at least 10 percent of the group assets (including intangibles), by value, located in the foreign country; and
3. during a 12-month testing period, has at least 10 percent of the group sales made in the foreign country.
However, the IRS was concerned that the 10 percent safe harbor provided by the 2006 temporary regulations could apply to certain transactions in a way that was inconsistent with the purposes of Section 7874, and so the 2009 temporary regulations eliminated this safe-harbor test and and also eliminated the examples illustrating the facts-and-circumstances determination with respect to the substantial-business-activities exception. Needless to say, eliminating the safe harbor test creates greater uncertainty about when an inversion transaction will come within the still-existing exception for substantial foreign business activities.
Turning to the practical effects of Section 7874 on business planning, the provision sends the all-too-clear message to domestic U.S. taxpayers that "you can check out anytime you like but you can never leave." It is the "Welcome to the Hotel California" approach to taxation. The provision implicitly suggests to U.S. taxpayers that they may be better off incorporating start-up businesses in another jurisdiction, and it implicitly warns foreign investors to be careful about incorporating businesses in the U.S.
In short, if you expect to get divorced one day, then definitely don’t get married, because the alimony tax under Section 7874 can be brutally expensive.
"Sophie’s Choice": Trying to Save the (IP) Children
If a U.S. corporation cannot gracefully exit from U.S. tax jurisdiction—and Section 7874 makes for a very expensive divorce—one logical alternative may be to try to at least send the valuable IP abroad, to stay with the proverbial Dutch Uncle. Intangible property can generally be transferred to a related foreign person through one of four mechanisms: (1) a sale; (2) a license; (3) a capital contribution; or (4) a reorganization (e.g., a merger with and into a foreign corporation).
However, the Code is active and vigilant in preventing exactly these types of transfers from occurring except as fully taxable transactions at fair market value. Intangible property transfers (including licenses) out of the United States are restricted by two main roadblocks: Section 367(d) and Section 482. Section 367(d) generally applies to a transfer of intangible property by a U.S. person to a foreign corporation that qualifies under Section 351 (incorporation transfer) or Section 361 (reorganization transfer)15 or to a capital contribution to an 80 percent-controlled foreign corporation.16 By contrast, Section 482 applies in the case of a sale or license of intangible property to a related foreign corporation.17 Therefore, the form of the transaction dictates which Code section applies.
Sections 367(d) and 482 both specifically mandate a commensurate-with-income standard to value the intangibles transferred, and they both look at Section 936(h)(3)(B) for the definition of intangible property. Accordingly, when transferring intangibles, corporations need, first, to identify whether those intangibles fit into the definition of Section 936(h)(3)(B)18 and, second, to value those intangibles under the commensurate-with-income standard.
Transfers of Assets under Section 367(a) versus under Section 367(d)
Section 367 is designed to override the "normal" tax-free treatment under Section 351 (capital contributions) and Section 361 (reorganizations) when a U.S. person transfers property to a foreign corporation instead of a domestic corporation. With regard to tangible property transfers, Section 367(a) treats a foreign corporation as "not a corporation" within the meaning of Section 351, which results in immediate recognition of gain by the transferor, but only gain, and realized losses remain unrecognized.19 This gain is limited to the amount of gain that would have been recognized had the appreciated property been disposed of in a taxable sale at fair market value.20 Section 367(a)(3)(A) provides an important exception that allows for the tax-free transfer of tangible property if such tangible property is subsequently used by a foreign corporation in the "active" conduct of a foreign trade or business.21 However, these provisions are not applicable to transfers of certain intangible property.22
With respect to specified intangible property transfers, Section 367(d) generally does not require immediate recognition of gain23 (in contrast to Section 367(a)), but instead requires the transferor to recognize income periodically as if receiving payments contingent upon the productivity, use, or disposition of the intangible property.24 Section 367(d) re-characterizes the transfer of intangible assets by a U.S. person to a foreign corporation in connection with any exchange described in Sections 351 or 361 as a taxable sale of the intangible asset in exchange for a stream of contingent payments, the amount and calculation of which is astonishingly vague and poorly defined. Section 367(d) does specify that the payment amounts are supposed to be "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible," and shall be treated as ordinary income.25 However, as a practical matter, the transaction is not really treated as a "sale" of property—for example, there is no apparent recovery of tax basis in the transferred intangible asset—and the payment stream is all ordinary income and is sourced to the U.S.26
Section 367(d) justifies its taxation of the outbound transfer of intangible property based on the assumption that the U.S. transferor would have the power to compel payments by the foreign transferee. However, Section 367(d) treats the U.S. transferor as having income even when the transferor has no power to compel payments and even if the transferor does not control the foreign transferee or never receives any payments for the intangible property.27
The imputed payment regime under Section 367(d) continues throughout the useful life of the intangible asset, which is the entire period during which the asset has value, but is subject to a limitation of 20 years.28 Moreover, Section 367(d) makes this particularly unattractive as a mechanism for transferring intangible assets because the imputed payments are deemed to be U.S. source income,29 and this limits the ability of the U.S. transferor to claim or utilize foreign tax credits.
The Obama Administration has proposed to further limit the shifting of income through intangible property transfers.30 As is discussed in the article, "The IRS Gets Jealous: Oh, Ruby, Don’t Take Your Love to Town or Your Intangibles Out of the Country," (Practical International Tax Strategies, May 15, 2010, p. 2) the U.S. government is not satisfied with the Section 367(d) "commensurate with income" standard as a proper barrier against shifting of income through intangible property transfers.31 Accordingly, the proposal’s stated intent is to "clarify" (broaden) the definition of "intangible" to include workforce in place, goodwill, and going concern value. However, rather than clarifying the current law, this proposal’s true effect is to dramatically expand Section 367(d) and place goodwill and going concern value—normally the core value of a modern trade or business—under vague and ominous rules. As a result, the class of assets subject to Section 367(d) would be broadened substantially, and in some cases almost the entire aggregate fair value of a business would be subject to Section 367(d).32Sales and Licenses of IP under Section 482
Given the extremely adverse tax consequences that appear to apply under Section 367(d), U.S. persons invariably explore the alternative of a taxable license or sale transaction in lieu of a tax-free transaction under Section 351 or Section 361. As noted above, Section 367(d) does not apply to a bona fide sale or a license. However, if a cross-border transaction involves a related party, the IRS will scrutinize the transaction carefully under Section 482 to ensure that the consideration paid reflects fair market value.
A comprehensive discussion of Section 482 is beyond the scope of this article, but the basic principles of Section 482 applicable to this area are relatively simple to summarize: A U.S. person generally must transfer property in a sale to a related foreign person at a price equal to the fair market value, or arm’s length price, of the property (i.e., the price at which the property would change hands in a transaction between unrelated persons). Analogously, under a licensing arrangement, the parties are required to enter into a formal agreement in which the royalty rate is the same as that which a third party would charge, given the nature of the technology itself and the terms of the transfer.
In general, Section 482 is an economist’s paradise and a taxpayer’s nightmare. The IRS exhaustively investigates the economic relationship between related parties, and then determines the arm’s length price in a particular transaction. Section 482 applies explicitly to transfers and licenses of intangible assets.33 Arm’s length consideration for intangible property transferred for commercial exploitation, via an outright sale or by licensing, is determined using one of four methods prescribed under the regulations: (1) the Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction Method (CUT); (2) the Comparable Profits Method (CPM); (3) the Profit Split Method; and (4) unspecified methods.34 The choice of methods is governed by the "best method rule" (i.e., the method that produces the most reliable results under the prevailing circumstances35). A taxpayer is required to maintain extensive documentation to support its transfer pricing methodology and can be subject to severe penalties for noncompliance.
A cost-sharing arrangement is a somewhat different animal, in which pre-existing intellectual property is transferred expressly for research purposes, as distinct from commercial exploitation purposes. Under the cost-sharing provisions, addressed in greater detail below, one is required to value pre-existing intangible assets (or "platform contributions") using a different set of methodologies (e.g., the Income Method, the Market Capitalization Method, the Acquisition Price Method, etc.).
Cost-Sharing Arrangements
Until recently, perhaps the most popular means of "transferring" intangible assets out of the United States has been through the use of a cost-sharing arrangement (CSA) permitted by the applicable regulations.36 Under a CSA, two or more related parties (one or more based in the U.S. and one or more based in a foreign jurisdiction) agree in writing to contribute jointly to the costs of developing the intangible asset in proportion to their shares of reasonably anticipated benefits from the asset that is developed.37
The cost-sharing arrangement first gained popularity after the enactment in 1984 of Section 367(d), which, as mentioned above, made it virtually impossible to transfer intangible assets to a related foreign entity on a tax-free basis. On December 20, 1995, the IRS issued (temporarily) final cost-sharing regulations,38 which required "buy-in" payments when a controlled participant owned pre-existing intangible assets and contributed these assets to the cost-sharing arrangement for research purposes. Other controlled participants were required to pay an arm’s-length charge for these rights.39 However, over time, the IRS became increasingly concerned that pre-existing intangible assets were being significantly undervalued by taxpayers seeking to transfer such assets offshore for much less than arm’s length consideration.40 To address this concern, in August 2005, Treasury issued "the 2005 Proposed Regulations,"41 which were both more complex and substantially more restrictive than the 1995 Regulations.
The 2005 Proposed Regulations adopted the "investor model" to address contributions of pre-existing intangible assets to a CSA. In order to determine arm’s length buy-in payments under the investor model, each controlled participant is viewed "as making an aggregate investment . . . for purposes of achieving an anticipated return [purportedly] appropriate to the risks of the cost sharing arrangement over the term of the development and exploitation of the intangibles resulting from the arrangement."42 In January 2009, Treasury issued "the 2009 Temporary Regulations," which replaced the 1995 Final Regulations and the 2005 Proposed Regulations in their entirety, effective January 5, 2009.43 The 2009 Temporary Regulations incorporate the "investor model" introduced in the 2005 Proposed Regulations. They also radically modify the rules governing "buy-in" payments (now referred to as "Platform Contribution Transactions," or PCTs), relative to the 1995 Regulations.44
Under the 2009 Temporary Regulations, an arrangement must satisfy certain substantive45 and administrative requirements46 in order to be considered as a CSA. One minor change from the 1995 Final Regulations is the substantive requirement that interests must be divided on a non-overlapping basis.47 The 2009 Temporary Regulations expressly authorize a division based on territorial interests; however, unlike the 2005 Proposed Regulations, the 2009 Temporary Regulations also permit divisions based on field of use or any other basis that meets the requirements of Reg. §1.482-7T((b)(4)(iv).48
More broadly, the 2009 Temporary Regulations attempt to make cost-sharing no more attractive, from a tax planning standpoint, than a simple licensing arrangement. As a practical matter, cost-sharing is vastly less attractive than licensing in most cases, because the IRS’s method of choice under the 2009 Temporary Regulations, the Income Method, often produces very large buy-in fees based largely on guesswork. The calculation of such a fee requires that taxpayers (a) develop detailed projections of each cost-sharing participant’s operating results over the life of the platform contribution, generally assumed by the IRS to be infinite, and (b) determine a reasonable risk-adjusted discount rate. Moreover, if the participants’ results turn out to be less favorable than the projected results, the original buy-in fee will generally stand. Conversely, under Section 482’s "commensurate with income" requirement, the IRS has the authority, and the motivation, to retroactively adjust the buy-in fee if cost-sharing participants’ actual and projected results diverge in the reverse direction. (According to the preamble to the 2009 Temporary Regulations, the periodic adjustment provisions are applicable to all PCTs, including those that are not Section 936(h)(3)(B) intangibles, even though the Section 936(h)(3)(B) definition is already quite broad.49)
As a result of these regulatory developments, it has become increasingly difficult to find a suitable means of migrating intellectual property out of the United States at anything less than devastating alimony tax costs.50 Stated differently, the CSA has become a notably less effective tool for moving IP from the United States to a foreign jurisdiction since the enactment of the 2009 Temporary Regulations.
Practical Tax Strategies
As described above, the rules governing U.S. alimony taxes are well-known, even if they are complex and at times maddeningly vague. The ultimate issue is to offer sensible advice and practical tax strategies to deal with these complex and often-Draconian rules. The following are some suggestions on how best to anticipate and deal with alimony taxes:
1. Don’t get married. In other words, don’t put your company or your IP into a high tax jurisdiction in the first place. This seems like a simple observation, but in fact it is a compellingly powerful statement. Alimony taxes can trap unwary parties in the short term, but in the long term such taxes should encourage corporate suitors to be skittish and to avoid coming into the wrong taxing jurisdiction in the first place.
One of the most famous moments in the history of tax legislation occurred when Robert Perlman, former vice president of taxes at Intel Corporation, testified to the Senate Finance Committee in 1999 about the effects of U.S. tax laws: "If Intel were to be founded today, I would strongly advise that the parent company be incorporated outside the United States."51 At the time his comment drew indignation and created a major furor in the U.S. Congress; today, it mere smacks of candor and common sense.
Significantly, some important American companies, including Accenture and Seagate Technologies, made the astute decision to incorporate abroad from the onset, and thus avoided the U.S. exit tax regime.52 Good news travels fast—and so will new IP start-up companies.
2. Get out while the getting is good. For companies that are already in the United States, the door has been closing quickly and ominously. In 2010, the Obama Administration, in the annual "Green Book," proposed to make it even more difficult to move assets (especially IP assets), once created, reasonably and cost effectively out of the United States.53 Therefore, there are two related strategies. First, go now because later is likely to be even worse. Second, to the extent new IP is being created, create it offshore.
3. Turn your money into offshore IP. A critical insight about intellectual property is that you can always convert cash into IP with an offshore situs, simply by sending the money on a foreign holiday and then spending it "offshore" to pay the people who have the brains to create valuable IP. In fact, money can almost always be changed, practically like a currency-conversion transaction, into valuable intellectual property. Granted you have the risk that your research does not pan out or does not produce the quality and value that you expected, but that is true of all research projects. Spend lots of money on lots of research projects, and on average you will come up with lots of pretty good (and sometimes incredibly valuable) intangible assets.
Money can always be moved offshore, absent currency restrictions or repatriation limitations. Those kinds of controls are episodically put in place by desperate political regimes, but money at the moment can still flow relatively freely around the world. In other words, money can boldly go (like the Starship Enterprise) where intellectual property cannot.
The obvious idea, therefore, is to put the money where you want the IP to be, and then use the money to create the IP in the right location. For example, a Bermuda corporation, following funding, can contract with talent and resources in the United States to create the "next generation" of IP. The "gestalt" value, meaning the genius or inspiration value of the intellectual property, will be transferred offshore, all for a "cost-plus" pricing regime. In effect, if you pay people their hourly wage, you get to keep all the benefits of their labor, even if their labor creates assets dramatically more valuable than the compensation amount. There are arm's-length pricing issues under Section 482 when the company is essentially paying itself to do the research for an offshore entity, but even this problem can be avoided by the simple expediency of contracting always with unrelated third parties. Move money offshore, contract with somebody to create valuable IP, and "Voila!" you have property located where it is not subject to alimony taxes.

In summary, international tax law is the new marriage: Your tax jurisdiction expects to tax you, in sickness and in health, for as long as it can—and then hopes to collect alimony taxes if you decide to seek a divorce. This article suggests the wisdom of picking your tax marriage partners carefully, and then entering the relationship with your eyes wide open. The old canard suggested that people marry the first time for love and the second time for money, but in the case of international taxation, all tax jurisdictions are intent on getting married for the second time. It is okay to love your tax jurisdiction—marriage can be a genuinely good thing—but you want to be sure to consider a pre-nup before you tie the knot.
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• patents, inventions, formulae, designs, patterns, know-how
• copyrights, literary, musical or artistic compositions
• trademarks, trade names, or brand names
• franchises, licenses, or contracts
• methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists, or technical data
• any similar item
Under current provisions, Section 367(d) does not apply to the transfer of foreign goodwill, or going concern value. Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(b).
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• a U.S. person transfers the assets of a foreign branch with previously deducted losses [Temp. Reg. §1.367(a)-6T(c)(4): This regulation looks at the gain realized based on the fair market value of the intangible property on the date of the transfer]; or
• a U.S. person that incurred an "overall foreign loss" transfers the intangible property used outside of the U.S. [Section 904(f)(3)].
Under both of the cases above, the income required to be reported under Section 367(d) is reduced by the immediately recognized gain [Temp. Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(g)(3)].
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• CSTs.
• PCTs.
• Divisional Interests.
Each controlled participant must receive a non-overlapping interest in the cost shared intangibles without further obligation to compensate another controlled participant for such interest (other than those required by CSTs and PCTs).
All controlled participants must commit to, and in fact, engage in platform contributions transactions (PCTs) to the extent that there are platform contributions pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. In a PCT, each other controlled participant (PCT Payor) is obligated to, and must in fact, make arm's length payments (PCT Payments) to each controlled participant (PCT Payee) that provides a platform contribution.
All controlled participants must commit to, and in fact, engage in cost-sharing transactions. In CSTs, the controlled participants make payments to each other (CST Payments) as appropriate, so that in each taxable year each controlled participant's intangible development cost (IDC) share is in proportion to its respective reasonably anticipated benefit (RAB) share;
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See Beeton, Clayson, and Forsyth, IP in Transfer Pricing Planning, Transfer Pricing International Journal (April 2010).
See "The IRS Gets Jealous: Oh, Ruby, Don’t Take Your Love to Town or Your Intangibles Out of the Country," Practical International Tax Strategies, May 15, 2010.
Elizabeth Chorvat, You Can’t Take It With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate Expatriations, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 453, 456 n.7 (2003).
International Tax Issues Relating to Globalization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of Robert Perlman, Vice President of Taxes of Intel Corporation).
See Reg. §§1.482-7T(d)(1), (k)(1)(ii) and 1.482-7A(b)(3), (4)(ii) (requiring a qualified cost-sharing arrangement to include a provision mandating adjustments to a participant's share of development costs to account for, among other things, changes in economic conditions).
T.D. 9441, Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6).
Reg. §1.482-7T(b)(4)(ii), (iii) and (iv).
Reg. §1.482-7(b)(1)(iii).
Reg. §§1.482-7T(b)(2) and 1.482-7T(k).
Reg. §1.482-7T(b)(1): The substantive requirements are that:
Reg. §§1.482-7T(a)(2) and -7T(b)(1)(ii). See generally the discussion in Charles Cope and Thomas Zollo, Changes to the Unites States Cost Sharing Arrangements, Transfer Pricing International Journal (January 2009).
T.D. 9441, 74 Fed. Reg. 340 (1/5/09); REG-144615-02, 74 Fed. Reg. 236 (1/5/09). The 2009 Temporary Regulations apply to new CSAs and to previously qualified CSAs that were in existence on January 5, 2009. However, the temporary regulations’ impact on existing CSAs should be minor as long as there is no "material change" in the scope of the CSA after January 5, 2009 and the written contract evidencing the CSA is amended by July 6, 2009 to conform with Reg. §1.482-7T, and the activities of the controlled participants "substantially comply" with the new requirements under Reg. §1.482-7T as modified for existing CSAs. See Reg. §1.482-7T(m); Neal M. Kochman, Parsing the Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations, 38 TM International Journal 555 (2009).
See Preamble to 2005 Proposed Regulations REG-144615-02, 70 Fed. Reg. 51116 (8/29/05): "In this regard, valuations are not appropriate if an investor would not undertake to invest in the arrangement because its total anticipated return is less than the total anticipated return that could have been achieved through an alternative investment that is realistically available to it."
REG-144615-02, 70 Fed. Reg. 51116 (8/29/05).
See Preamble to 2005 Proposed Regulations REG-144615-02, 70 Fed. Reg. 51116 (8/29/05); See also Neal M. Kochman, Parsing the Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations, 38 TM International Journal 555, fn. 5 (2009) citing four cases involving buy-in issues that have been either docketed in the Tax Court or decided by the Tax Court: Veritas Software Corp. v. Comr., 133 T.C. 297 (2009) (nonacquiescence by Comissioner, AOD 2010-49); Xilinx Inc. v. Comr., 125 T.C. 37 (2005) (affirmed by Xilinx Inc. v. Comr., 598 F.3d 1191 (2010)); Medtronic Inc. v. Comr., T.C. No. 17488-08 (7/15/08); and First Data Corp. v. Comr., T.C. No. 7042-09 (3/20/09).
Reg. §1.482-7(g)(2) (1995). See also footnote 44.
T.D. 8632, 1996-1 C.B. 85.
Reg. §1.482-7A(a)(1); Reg. §1.482-7T(b)(1).
Reg. §1.482-7A (applicable before January 5, 2009) and Reg.§1.482-7T (applicable on and after January 5, 2009).
Reg. §1.482-1(c)(1).
Reg. §1.482-4(a).
Reg. §1.482-4.
Thomas M. Zollo, Clarification or Modification? The Tax Treatment of the Outbound Transfer of Goodwill, Going Concern Value, and Workforce in Place to a Foreign Corporation, 39 TM International Journal 71, 11 (2010); See Green Book at p. 32.
See "The IRS Gets Jealous: Oh, Ruby, Don’t Take Your Love to Town or Your Intangibles Out of the Country," Practical International Tax Strategies, May 15, 2010.
See U.S. Department of Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals, at p. 32 (May 2009) (Green Book).
See Reg. §1.367(d)-IT(c)(1).
See Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(c)(3).
Temp. Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(a) states that the U.S. person receives payments for tax purposes "regardless of whether such payments are in fact made by the transferee."
Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(c)(1).
Section 367d)(2)(A)(Last sentence); Section 367(d)(2)(C).
Section 367(d)(2)(A).
The immediate recognition of gain under Section 367(d) may happen if:
Section 367(d)(1)(A); Section 367(a)(3)(B)(iv).
Tangible property and also goodwill transferred under the "active" business rule can trigger gain to the extent of previously deducted branch losses.
Reg. §1.367(a)-1T(b)(3)(i).
Reg. §1.367(a)-1T(b)(1). Special rules apply to the outbound transfer of shares which is beyond the scope of this article.
For these purposes, the term "intangible property" is defined in Section 936(h)(3)(B), and includes the following property, if such property has substantial value independent of services:
Temp. Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(g)(4)(i). However, if the purported sale or license were a "sham," then Section 367(d) would still apply to that transaction. Temp. Reg. §1.367(d)-1T(g)(4)(ii).
Section 367(c)(2).
Section 367(d)(1).
Former Reg. §1.7874-2T(d)(2).
Reg. §1.7874-2T(g)(3). The factors to be considered include: the historical presence in the foreign country, the level of property and services and sales in the foreign country, managerial activities by employees based in the foreign country, the level of ownership by investors in the foreign country, and whether business activities within the foreign country are material to the achievement of the overall business objectives of the EAG.
Reg. §1.7874-2T(d)(1).
See T.D. 9238, 2006-6 I.R.B. 408, stated "income or gain required to be recognized by the expatriated entity … cannot be offset by net operating losses or credits (other than credits allowed under Section 901). .
Section 7874(d)(2).
Section 7874(a), 7874(d).
Section 7874(b).
Section 7874(c)(1).
Section 7874(a)(2)(B).
Inversions are largely paper transactions where a U.S. corporation first creates a subsidiary in a foreign country. Corporate ownership is then "inverted" by turning the foreign subsidiary into the parent company in an effort to avoid U.S. taxation on income earned abroad. See Michael J. Graetz, Foundations of International Income Taxation, 113, Foundation Press (2003).
26 USC Title 26—Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Unless otherwise noted, all Section references refer to the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code") and the regulations promulgated thereunder (the "Treasury Regulations" or "Reg.").
See Notice 94-46, which was a reaction to the Helen of Troy Corporation’s inversion into a Bermuda parent. The first wave of inversions took place around 1994, and at that time companies were somewhat restrained in implementing inversion transactions because they did not want to subject their shareholders to taxation under existing Section 367 rules. However, around 2001, the shareholder level tax imposed by Section 367 was perceived as less of an impediment because "many shareholders were likely either (1) U.S. individuals not having meaningful (if any) gains in their shares, or (2) non-individuals with little tax sensitivity to a mark-to-market event." See Tretiak and Jackman, Cross-Border Business Combinations, Int’l Tax Journal, 7; fn. 4 (2009).
The United States currently has one of the highest statutory corporate tax rates in the world.
Mitchell A. Kane and Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, University of Pennsylvania ILE Research Paper No. 07-16, p. 1 (2007).

Sunday, December 30, 2007

Barry Bonds' 756th Home Run Ball: The (Tax) Catch

Barry Bonds' Home Run #756: There Could be a (Tax) Catch

by Joseph B. Darby III, Esq.

Sometime in the next week or so, San Francisco Giants slugger Barry Bonds is expected to hit the 756th home run of his controversial career (as I pen these words, Bonds is rounding the proverbial third base with 755) and thus break Hank Aaron’s major league career record of 755. At the climactic moment, Bonds will deposit into the bleachers (and into the hands of a very fortunate fan) a standard-issue major league baseball with a normal retail value of about $14 that, upon arrival, will instantly appreciate in value to hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, if sold in the baseball memorabilia market.

This home run will certainly be an historic event. The question is whether “Catch 756” will also be a taxable event for the “lucky” fan.

This issue is instantly intriguing, and more than just academic. In 1998, when Mark McGuire hit his 70th home run in 1998 to set what was then a single-season home-run record, baseball collectibles (like almost everything else in 1998) were in the throes of a market frenzy; the ball was subsequently sold for a staggering $3 million. Similarly, Hank Aaron’s 755th home-run ball sold earlier in the 1990s for $650,000. Bonds’ record blast will be somewhat stigmatized by the steroids controversy that swirls around him, but even so the ball is estimated in advance to be worth approximately $500,000, and perhaps far more.

Faced with that kind of instant revenue, it would not be surprising if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) decided to play a little hard ball itself.

The tax issue is as highly charged as a typical Bonds home run blast. Whether “Catch 756” is or should be taxable has been discussed in a variety of publications, including The Wall Street Journal, and suffice it to say that most baseball fans (and taxpayers) are appalled at the thought that a home-run ball falling into your lap as a souvenir could be followed in short order by a tax bill from the IRS.

However, taxation of Catch 756 is not far-fetched. In fact, if the tax law is applied with the same careful scrutiny that umpires give to a typical major league game, it is not even a close call: A ball worth $500,000 is an “ascension to wealth” and is taxable income.

There are, however, a number of additional tax questions that may be a curve ball even to the IRS. Is the ball taxable when caught or only when sold? Can Taxpayer 756 treat his ticket cost (and maybe his hot dog and beers at the game) as either deductible expenses or as tax basis in the ball when he sells it? If the ball generates taxable income when caught, is it ordinary income or capital gain? Does the answer to the preceding question change if Taxpayer 756 holds the ball for a year and a day and then sells it on eBay?

These are things that inquiring tax minds want to know. And, with this record-breaking hit imminent, I have taken it upon myself to hunker down behind home plate and play the role of tax umpire. Like every good umpire, I promise only this: I will call ’em the way I see ’em.

Strike 1: Catch 756 is Income to Taxpayer 756

The first thing to realize is that, when it comes to tax law, the IRS is playing with a definite home field advantage. In a recent tax case with the too-good-to-be-true name of Murphy v. IRS1 (it was instantly dubbed “Murphy’s Law”), the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit examined in fulsome detail the question of what constitutes “income” for purposes of U.S. income taxation.

The Murphy case was the tax-law equivalent of a Casey-at-the-Bat moment: In its big chance at the plate, the federal court of appeals, being not particularly well versed in the ground rules of the tax game, whiffed badly. What the court did was reach the astonishing (initial) conclusion that § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) was “unconstitutional,” a decision that not only ignored about a century or so of jurisprudence but also, for all intents and purposes, abolished the Internal Revenue Code, and with it, the United States government.

The initial Murphy decision was booed vociferously by tax experts and other fans of coherent legal results, all of whom let the court know in no uncertain terms that it had dropped the ball. After several months of jarring ridicule from the cheap seats, the Court voluntarily vacated its decision,2 and, on rehearing, reached the legally correct conclusion that the term “income” is defined very broadly for purposes of the Code, and basically includes any “ascension to wealth”3 that is not expressly excluded from tax under the Code.

Applying Murphy’s Law to the matter of Catch 756, it is clear that catching a baseball worth hundreds of thousands of dollars is (assuming you can keep nearby fans from wrestling it away from you) an immediate and valuable ascension to wealth. Granted, the recipient/beneficiary/ball catcher has done nothing whatsoever to “earn” the income, but this does not mean it is not income—it merely means that it is not subject to social security or self-employment taxes on earned income and wages.

Income over the years has been defined to include prizes and awards, gambling winnings, lottery winnings, lost property found by the taxpayer, buried treasure dug up by the taxpayer, and even the benefit enjoyed if someone else pays your income taxes.4 Income even includes the rewards paid by the IRS to people who provide information that leads to the collection of additional taxes.5 (This legendary IRS program, known as the “drop a dime” program, even has its own form, Form 211, which also comes in Spanish, Form 211(SP).)

Under Murphy’s Law, every ascension to wealth is income unless there is an explicit exclusion from taxation under the Code. For example, a scholarship received by a college student is not income—but only because it is expressly excluded in Code § 117. When a lessee makes improvements to a landlord’s property, and the improvements revert to the landlord at the end of the lease, this reversion is not income to the landlord—but only because of the exclusion contained in Code § 109.

If you own your own home, federal income tax law does not currently treat you as realizing income equal to the rental value of your house—but it probably could. In fact, this issue was considered rather seriously when the very first U.S. income tax was imposed during the American Civil War. Fortunately, President Abraham Lincoln and his administration sensibly recognized that, if they tried to take that position, they would have a civil war on their hands—in addition to the one they were already fighting—and so this particular ascension to wealth has not, historically, been considered taxable income. Neither has catching a souvenir baseball at a baseball game—but there is a first time for everything.

The point is, just because it seems unfair to tax something, that does not make it exempt from taxation. I once represented an individual who won a £100,000 shopping spree at Harrods department store in London, as a part of an airline promotion. The taxpayer, giddy with delight, called me to ask about possible tax consequences. The bad news was that receipt of the £100,000 prize was fully taxable as income (at approximately a 40 percent combined federal and state income tax rate) plus, all purchases brought back from London to the United States would be subject to a 20 percent duty (another £20,000 in tax). In effect, the £100,000 “free” shopping spree was taxable at a combined rate of 60 percent, and thus amounted to a 40 percent discount on the first £100,000 of merchandise. The taxpayer went from giddy to morose—taxes can have that effect on people.

The point is that Taxpayer 756 does not want to be caught off base. Taxpayer 756 might be tempted to slide one past the IRS by trying to keep a low profile. However, this plan has certain drawbacks. For example, every camera and microphone in America will be trained on the person who makes Catch 756, and so relying on anonymity to protect you has obvious shortcomings.

Rather than try to avoid the tax tag, Taxpayer 756 may just decide to proclaim his ascension to wealth and pay the tax. After all, sitting in the bleachers and having $500,000 drop into your lap would, by anyone’s standards, constitute a real steal: No one would blame Taxpayer 756 if he felt like he, too, had just hit a home run. Taxpayer 756 can reap the glory, sell the ball—and pay the taxes.

Still another distinct possibility is that Taxpayer 756 might well decide to catch the ball, tuck it away, and then run for luck. After all, the IRS, to this author’s knowledge, has never attempted to assert that a baseball caught at a baseball game is taxable income. In short, there is a very distinct possibility that the IRS will drop the ball on this one. However, banking on an IRS error seems, to say the least, a chancy strategy.

Strike 2: Catch 756 Is Taxable at the Time of the Catch

The next interesting tax question raised by Catch 756 is when, in time, the income is recognized by Taxpayer 756. Is it when he catches the ball? Or is it when he goes to sell the ball? The correct answer should be that the income event occurs at the time of the catch. That is when the taxpayer experiences the “ascension to wealth.” The fact that the ascension arrives in the form of a Rawlings baseball should make no difference from a tax perspective. After all, when it comes to income taxes it does not matter whether you are paid in cash or in “kind”—cash or cabbages, stock or (Barry) Bonds home-run balls, it is all the same to the IRS.

It is true that some ascensions to wealth are not “realized” immediately. For example, if the “Bonds” you are holding are U.S. Treasury Bonds, and they appreciate in value due to fluctuations in interest rates, this built-in appreciation is not taxable unless or until the bonds are sold. Similarly, appreciation in the value of stocks, or real property, is not taxable until there is a sale or exchange transaction. However, catching a baseball seems analogous to winning a prize in a contest, finding a lost item or discovering a buried treasure—all of which are income at the time that the winner/finder/discoverer has unfettered legal ownership of the applicable property.

Ball 1: I Caught The Ball —But It Belongs to Someone Else

A situation that arises rather frequently with lottery tickets is that two or more people agree in advance to “pool” their tickets and their winnings. Such “lottery partnerships” have been respected by the IRS and upheld in courts as bona fide arrangements for income tax purposes.
It is conceivable that the fans in the right field bleachers (or the kayakers in McCovey Cove behind the right field wall in San Francisco) might do something very smart and agree not to beat each other to a bloody pulp while scrambling for the ball, and instead agree to share the ownership of the baseball jointly among themselves. Getting everyone to sign up would be a considerable feat, but it is not out of the realm of possibility that the ball will be caught, not by an individual sports fan, but by a member of an impromptu “bleachers partnership.” For example, four friends sitting together at the game might agree to share the ball equally if any one of them catches it—in which case the four would split both the economic benefits and the tax consequences. After all, baseball itself is a team game, so why shouldn’t the same principle apply in the stands?

Ball 2: I Should Be Allowed to Deduct the Cost of My Season Tickets

While Catch 756 should generate income to Taxpayer 756 under the principles of Murphy’s law, the IRS would be in foul territory if it tried to deny Taxpayer 756 the right to deduct some of his expenses. For example, going to the ballpark to catch baseballs is probably not a “trade or business” for tax purposes, and instead would be a recreational or “hobby” activity governed by Code § 183. However, that Code section generally allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses up to the amount of any income realized from the “hobby” activity.

In the case of Taxpayer 756, he clearly ought to be able to claim the cost of his ticket as a deductible expense. Don’t laugh: If Taxpayer 756 bought a “scalped” ticket, the cost could be hundreds or even thousands of dollars for a game with this kind of unique historical importance. For that reason, Taxpayer 756 might further assert that he should be allowed to deduct the full cost of his season tickets: The “hobby” activity is attending baseball games, and all costs of the hobby should be netted against the unexpected windfall of Catch 756. As the tax umpire, I think these IRS pitches are outside the strike zone, and I would rule in favor of the taxpayer.

Ball 3: The Beer and Hot Dogs Should Also Be Deductible

Taxpayer 756 might argue that he should also be allowed to deduct all related expenses incurred in attending the game, including parking, seats for the other members of his family (I couldn’t go unless I brought the kids with me!), hot dogs (I had to eat to maintain my strength!), beers (It was hot out there, your honor!), and cracker jacks (I had to keep the kids quiet so that I could concentrate on catching the ball!). These are tough calls for the tax umpire, but I think they are just off the outside corner of the plate, and so I would rule in the taxpayer’s favor on these as well.

The argument for allowing deductibility of these “ballgame” expenses is not totally far fetched, since you can’t catch a baseball without attending a baseball game, and you can’t attend a baseball game without incurring these “reasonable” expenses, so the arguments might well stand up in litigation—although neither the IRS nor the taxpayer would waste the time to take these issues to court. Practically speaking, the IRS would likely agree to any reasonable expenses incurred at the game that Taxpayer 756 could document, since all these amounts added together will be little more than “chump change” compared to the value of Catch 756.

Fouled Out of Play: The Catch Generates Ordinary Income; Afterwards, the Ball is a Capital (Collectible) Asset

Deciding whether Catch 756 generates ordinary income or capital gain is a very interesting exercise, in part because one has to decide what, exactly, Taxpayer 756 did to generate the income. First of all, the baseball itself is probably not a “capital asset” in the hands of the taxpayer until it is actually in the hands of the taxpayer. In other words, “catching” the ball is probably the income event, not “holding” the ball. Arguably, catching the ball is an activity that is “ordinary” in nature, kind of like finding buried treasure or answering the questions correctly on Jeopardy.

By contrast, once the ball is in the hands of Taxpayer 756, Catch 756 should thereafter be a capital asset, and eligible for favorable capital gains tax rates if held for more than one year. One significant issue is whether the baseball would be subject to the normal 15% capital gains tax rate, or th special 28% rate imposed on “collectibles.” Remarkably enough, although Catch 756 would probably fit any baseball fan’s definition of “collectible” it may not fit the definition in the Code, which specifies that a collectible is defined in Code Section 408(m), and is comprised of “any work of art, any rug or antique, any metal or gem, any stamp or coin, any alcoholic beverage, or any other tangible personal property specified by IRS for this purpose.” Thus far, it appears that the IRS has neglected to specify home runs balls within the scope of collectibles, and thus is may well qualify for the favorable 15% rate.

As a practical matter, if Taxpayer 756 decides to hold Catch 756 rather than sell it right away, he might argue that the ball is worth a specified amount, based on an appraisal, e.g., $500,000, at the time of Catch 756. If the ball were then held for a period of more than one year before being sold, the increase in value would be characterized as capital gain, subject to the special capital gains tax rate.

By the way, like the game of baseball, assets have “bases” for tax purposes. In this case, assuming Catch 756 was reported as an ordinary income event in the year of catch (and assuming tax were paid on the reported amount from other funds), the ball should then have a tax basis equal to the amount of income reported. Any growth in value (or decrease in value) after the catch date would represent the amount of capital gain (or loss) recognized on a later sale.

The 3-2 Pitch: What I Think Will Really Happen

Tax experts, like physicists, are notorious for getting immersed in the minutiae. The reality is that much of the foregoing discussion is about tax theory rather than real IRS practice. The IRS to date has been conspicuously silent about how it views the tax treatment of astonishingly valuable baseballs being distributed randomly to fans (or passersby) through the means of batting.

In fact, history suggests that the IRS tends to show up at the same time the money shows up—when a ball is sold. In most cases, a baseball fan will either sell a souvenir ball right away and thus convert the ball to cash in the same year, or (less often, but not infrequently) will return it to the ballplayer. In the former case, the IRS wants its share of any cash; in the latter case, to my knowledge, the IRS has never attempted to tax this act of generosity (although, again, under a strict construction of the tax law the IRS could probably treat a catch-and-return, as (1) taxable income, followed by (2) a taxable gift).

And what if Taxpayer 756 catches the ball and decides to keep it? Based on past history, the IRS has not made a major effort to keep track of and tax such mementos. However, be aware that the IRS in recent years has become aggressive in tracking income of sports stars from card shows and autograph sessions, and therefore the taxation of fans who catch million-dollar baseballs is not out of the question.

In short, if Taxpayer 756 decides to hold onto the Catch 756, don’t be surprised if the IRS tags him with a hefty tax bill. As all of us are reminded every April 15th, the IRS’s job is to take the requisite piece out of every taxpayer’s hide—whether the ascension to wealth for the previous year is received in the form of cash, real estate or cowhide-covered balls.

__________
1Marrita Murphy v. IRS, No. 05-5139 (C.A.D.C. August 22, 2005), 460 F.3d 79, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,476, 2006 WL 2411372 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2006), reversing 362 F. Supp.2d 206 (D.D.C. March 22, 2005).
2Docket, case no. 05-5139, unnumbered entry on April 23, 2007, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
3Income is generally all ascensions to wealth except a return of capital or an unrealized appreciation in value.
4See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 53-61; Reg. § 1.61-14(a).
5Internal Revenue Manual 25.2.2.2(2), 4/27/1999.

Saturday, December 29, 2007

First Post

I want to thank my great friend Carl Hoffman for getting me started!!!!

Everything good that may come of this redounds to his credit; all the errors and missteps are mine alone.

Jay